

TRANSCRIPT OF DCI, DDCI, and DDO INTERVIEWS

WITH

DAVID OTTAWAY

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INTERVIEW WITH DDCI

(Monitored in progress)

KERR ...Based on our assessment of the individual and his own plans, and some very real uncertainty on his own part as to what he was going to do after he got the Commandante. It was quite clear that his plans were essentially, he hoped people would rally to his side, you know. Our assessment of that was that hope for things to happen without certainty involved in them and without cause of action, our troops would probably have limited chance for success against Martin Wiley's opponent. So I, you know, from my perspective, again, we did on the scene (passage indistinct) occasions that cross organization lines, that is always a problem in fast-moving situations, particularly when the U.S. military is involved, intelligence tends to become very much support, because after all they have their own organic intelligence, so that is always a problem to try to figure out how to manage and organize that process.

OTTAWAY So the talk about the problem of Congressional restrictions affecting what the Agency does ...

KERR I think those are more philosophical discussions of the difference, of problems between the Executive and the Congress as to who is in charge of foreign policy, rather than specifics in this regard.

OTTAWAY But there wasn't any problem for the people on the ground about what they, how they could behave, or things they could do, say or not say, or...

KERR No, no, I think they knew, and they did, more importantly, they did what made sense and what was within the limits of our role.

OTTAWAY Which was to find out what they were all about?

KERR Find out what they were doing and trying to assess the likelihood of success.

OTTAWAY What percent did you give on that one?

KERR He didn't really give a percent, but he said "not confident," not very confident that this had the earmarks of a successful coup. I think on balance saying it was not a very likely. Now, the one thing I would prefer you not do in terms of what, I don't know what you are going to do with this, but I am a little concerned about describing the role of our officer in Panama because it puts him in some jeopardy, our people.

OTTAWAY Well, my question was, since the issue has been raised in the press of whether or not Congressional restrictions...

KERR Yeah, no that is not a problem.

OTTAWAY ... affected the behavior of and...

KERR No, and that did not.

OTTAWAY I am trying to get your reaction to those allegations that have been in the press.

KERR I don't think the limitations or the things that have gone on between the Senate Select Committee and the oversight committees on our actions provides any limits. We did what we should have done. That we would have done that is kind of the role of an intelligence officer.

INTERVIEW WITH DDO

STOLZ I was a little surprised to see the story before you had a chance to talk to the Director.

OTTAWAY Well, we tried to get through at the end of the week, but I didn't know when the story was going to run, as I said. I couldn't guarantee it wasn't going to be in over the weekend. It was the editor's decision, not the writer's decision. Anyway, uh, can we talk on-the-record or off-the-record?

GREENLEAF I think on-the-record is fine. If there is anything you want to say off-the-record, that is fine, too.

STOLZ I have to ask before the recording starts, although I am an overt employee, I, as you no doubt know, part of my job is, I guess what I have to say is that I really don't like these, going on the record, but, so anyway, let's go ahead on that basis.

OTTAWAY On which basis? I am confused.

STOLZ On the basis that I, that you presumably asked me what I thought of the article, and I guess I can take a few specific points and I would be happy to discuss that on the record.

OTTAWAY All right.

STOLZ On the point that states "too lax in day to day management of intelligence," that is simply not true. I see him. I am Deputy Director for Operations, and I guess I ought to know, as well as anybody, the interest he takes in day-to-day, sometimes hour-to-hour management of the operations. There is a very rare day that I don't see him at least twice, on the phone, the secure line, constantly. And, uh, he has never disapproved an operation that I have proposed. He is open to my homework, properly so. He asks a lot of questions for which I am appreciative. That's one point. Another point is that if there is unhappiness with the conclusions based on

intelligence, uh, I suggest that you review the old cliché of "beheading the messenger." Sure, a lot of people do not like what they hear. Nothing new in that and that is not going to go away.

Now, on this one I prefer not to be on-the-record, it's a personal thing, that I am about to say now. This thing about his not having good support, in which you say there are many who say he is not close to Bush. That is not true, in my opinion. They are personal friends. You may know that when his wife died, George Bush had him stay up at Kennebunkport, and this was long before he became President. I have known him, we went to school together at Amherst. I have known him a long time. He does not brag about it, nothing to brag about, but he has had a close personal relationship with the President. We only mention that because of the

GREENLEAF I can also just add one thing, off-the-record at this point, because I am not sure if he wants me to say this, but I was in there when the President called him, about 45 minutes ago, specifically about his response to the article, stating he was disappointed to see it, that it was certainly not his view, and that he had his full confidence.

STOLZ Of course, this follows your quoting as saying, of course that is what they'll say in "the Rose Garden, kiss him on both cheeks." But, uh, to a specific point.

OTTAWAY How about going back to the details of operational issues. And, I don't know how you want to talk about this, but while I specifically got involved in this, having followed the Afghan operation for some time, what happened this spring and summer, arms supply, and the whole issue.

STOLZ There is an awful lot of misinformation in that whole thing, and I am glad you mentioned that, because they blamed him for placing a CIA analyst rather than someone from the Operations division, in charge of the whole operation. That is not true. The officer in question had four overseas posts. He had always been a DO officer. He had one tour as an NIO, which is the last one. That was the only time he has been outside of the DO in his entire career.

OTTAWAY So, he was not a logistician?

STOLZ Certainly not. He was a regular, old line, DO case officer with a very (words indistinct). He had my full confidence, as well as the Director's. Now as far as, you know, I can't, who struck John on all the stuff that Senator Humphrey and the other confidant, I can't remember that ...

OTTAWAY It's not just them, you know, Prime Minister Bhutto has also talked publicly about it.

STOLZ About what?

OTTAWAY About the reduction of arms over the turn of last year and coming

into the new year.

STOLZ There was an enormous number of stockpiled weapons in Afghanistan and Pakistan in February. If you are suggesting that there was some miscalculation as to the extent to which the Soviets were pouring it on after February 15, of course, you are right. But, that is not just for missiles. So, to the tune of some estimates, I don't know what they are, I don't know whether this is public or not ...

OTTAWAY 250 to 3 million (as heard).

STOLZ You have that.

OTTAWAY That was not expected. That kind of Soviet investment.

STOLZ That kind of Soviet investment was not expected by me, certainly, I am not an analyst, but I don't think anybody expected that. Especially, in view of their own economic problems and apparent desire of Gorbachev to disinvest himself of as many internal problems as he could. But, this business about not the right mix of weapons and they don't have any land mines, it's just not on... As far as present or future plans, I don't want to get into much of that, but we saw the Beilenson-Wilson letter, that kind of says it, as far as I am concerned. They, as you know...

OTTAWAY That was mostly looking backwards, not forwards.

STOLZ Well, that is correct, but I have not heard any particular complaints about the present situation ...

OTTAWAY What about Judge Webster's ... Congressmen, when they went and saw him in August, and felt that, uh, and I have heard this from other people, too, that Judge Webster is not a detail man on the operations side?

STOLZ I have had a number of involved operations, I suppose. When they involve serious political risks, he gets exhaustive charts, graphs, questions from a number of people involved, not just me. In terms of, and one of the things that I regret is that I have to spend so much time with him on the down side of, you know, the risks. There is a lot of good news out there that I don't have time to tell him. (passage indistinct)

In terms of, I mean, if you talk about being a detail man, the Director of Central Intelligence, 3 percent of the Intelligence Community's budget is covert action, so I think he can be forgiven for not knowing if a particular agent is going to be met on the northwest or southeast corner at a certain time. As far as I am concerned, he is fully engaged, he wants to know the details when there is a problem. And when I am proposing something that has, uh, that needs to come to his attention.

OTTAWAY So you are saying he is a detail man when he needs to know the details.

STOLZ Yeah. I think that is a fair characterization.

OTTAWAY On the, uh, talking on the Panama thing, whether or not there was, we didn't know much about these people.

STOLZ We had a fair book on them. It's true that we were not in intimate touch with them beforehand, for reasons which have already appeared in the press. The idea that anybody can know what is going on minute by minute in a situation like that is silly. I mean ...

OTTAWAY I think it is prior to it that you know something is going to happen and therefore you have time, you know, you take preparations, or have some contingency plan.

STOLZ I won't get into a back and forth on contingency planning and what CNN knew. The fact is when you get into a very, very volatile situation like that, it is often the case that a CNN will have that kind of information visually before CIA would have it. As far as a contingency plan is concerned, I ... you can address that elsewhere.

OTTAWAY Let me ask the question another way. Some things said, I think out of the White House, regarding congressional restrictions inhibiting the actions of Agency people on the ground, in particular regarding Panama. Are there congressional restrictions that bother you?

STOLZ We work very closely with Senator Boren and I know that he wants very much to have authority that he needs. The restrictions have to do with Executive Order, not a congressional order. But the interpretation of that and the way with which the various committees have over time interpreted them has led to, in my view, a proper caution on the part of the operators, including me. I might say that there is nothing in the Executive Order, as it is literally written, that is contrary to American values or my own views ...

OTTAWAY But, in the case of Panama, were the restrictions a problem and what could have been said or done, or found out?

STOLZ The whole issue revolves around whether or not, you know, what is assassination, or what is willful knowledge, and these are very tricky questions. I would say this, that, I mean, we may know even less about a future coup plotter because he or she might well feel that whatever I tell them is going to inhibit me, not me, the coup plotter. But, if you have a situation where someone tells you the only way to get rid of the son of a bitch is to kill him, are you condoning assassination?

OTTAWAY If you know their intentions.

STOLZ Yeah, or you think you know their intentions, or you say that you know. Sometimes it is not what they say but what they imply. "Oh, I don't want to kill him, but would you please let me have a few (words indistinct) chemicals?" So, is that inhibiting?

OTTAWAY Well, would that have made any difference in the outcome of how things happened in Panama?

STOLZ No, not at this...

OTTAWAY This is a more general problem, not a Panama problem?

STOLZ Yeah, it's a very general problem. The particular, I, the President is absolutely right when he says that, you know, even with the benefit of hindsight, would we have done anything, we, the U.S. government now. We had people with varying reputations, and it was very difficult to know what their capabilities were, and I don't want to get into the minute by minute, how come, did or didn't do, and all that because I simply do not want to get involved in that. But, it is always easy to say you have no, uh, insufficient information. I don't know if anybody said this or not, but I, uh, if you want to do something, you tend to not worry about how much information you have. If you don't want to do something, you never have enough information.

OTTAWAY Well, I mean, in the case of Panama, I guess there was a question as to whether we had enough information that this thing was in the works, and therefore we had time to take any contingency planning if A, B, or C happened. And, one has the impression that it was sort of sprung on ...

STOLZ Yeah, to my knowledge the, uh, information that they were planning this thing came up very quickly and there was not a long time, because they did not have it. I am always interested in why didn't you know, well, that is an old one, that the Soviet's were going to invade Czechoslovakia? Well, Dubcek did not know either. And, indeed, a decision was made on this scale by Gorbachev and others in order to (word indistinct) publicly, they often don't know what they are going to do. So, the idea of always knowing in advance what somebody else is going to do when he or she does not even know, it's a staple. I mean, we will always have that. People will always say why didn't you know this or that.

OTTAWAY What about China and how far that went? Did anybody expect that?

STOLZ Well, I don't want to get into that. You are here to talk about your article.

OTTAWAY So, on Afghanistan, you are not denying there were problems?

STOLZ In what?

OTTAWAY In delivery. You are saying there were stockpiles of...?

STOLZ No. I am saying that in our view and in the Mujahedin's view, they were mostly getting what they needed. There is equipment there. There was equipment there. There was an, I don't like to use the

word euphoria, but there, I repeat, it wasn't just sitting in this building. There are only a very few people I can think of who could have known the Soviets are not going to lie down so quickly. Very few.

OTTAWAY Sir, the official Community estimates as described on the Hill were that it would take them six months to a year, but the supplies do not seem to have been matched to the level of supplies. There seemed to be a difference between the official estimate, I, in fact, think people thought they were going to down in a few months afterwards, and that was the working hypothesis, despite what was officially being said of six to twelve months. And, that I think there was a problem there of two different judgments.

STOLZ I don't think, I think a lot of people thought the six was nearer than the twelve. I think a lot of people thought that. I don't want to get into a thing about the equipment because frankly I'm not a detail man either. I mean, I have all that information but I am not so sure that I have it in my head right now, nor am I sure I want to get into it anyway. You heard and it's true, the different kinds of battles that need to be fought. The Mujahedin are not used to seizing cities, taking the ground, holding ground, uh, they may well need some new concept, new training, but I think the idea that, "Oh, my God, the war isn't over, Najibullah would be in Geneva or Moscow by now, if only they had had the equipment," I guess it's just (word indistinct). That was just not so. You know, the "if only" argument, is not a valid argument.

OTTAWAY Well, thank you very much. Do you have any other comments you want to make?

STOLZ Well, off-the-record, my comment is that this is a hell of a town to work in and the kind of bullshit (word indistinct). But, uh, and I have no doubts, I don't deny, I don't dispute your statements that you got from your sources, but somebody got some lies out.

OTTAWAY Is it a question of who belongs to which club?

INTERVIEW WITH DCI

OTTAWAY Since we only have 10 minutes, the obvious question -- I tried to get through to you at the end of last week and you were busy -- about what is your feeling about some of these allegations that have been published?

JUDGE Yes, I thought we were going to have a meeting today. Is this the "ready, fire, aim" WASHINGTON POST?

OTTAWAY Ummmm, no.

GREENLEAF He says he has no control over what his editors do.

OTTAWAY Yeah, I mean we write the story. It's up to them when to use it. But I did try to make an effort to get through to you, as you know, at the end of the week. And I couldn't read you the article.

JUDGE Yeah. That's all right. I thought the story was still open. That's why I agreed to see you. So I don't really know what we're meeting about...

OTTAWAY Well, I think, what your view of your role in the administration, in policymaking, and whether you should be at the table or not. What are your views?

JUDGE Well, I think my views are shaped by the President, and I share the same views that he has about them that there has to be a line drawn between policymaking and production of intelligence. And that line is not always easy to draw. But I think that those who are working the problem both from the point of view of policy and the point of view of intelligence, which is my responsibility, have to keep that line in mind. In the first place it has to do with the objectivity of the intelligence that we provide. It wasn't too long ago that people were accusing the Agency of having a separate foreign policy agenda, of "cooking the books" to achieve that agenda, and raising questions about that type of activity. The President is very anxious that that not be perceived to be the case during his administration. And I have worked, I think very hard, to avoid any implication that this Agency has its own foreign policy agenda by doing a number of things. I revised the method in which the National Intelligence Estimates are prepared so that my role in that is on a par with the other heads of agencies. We have some responsibilities in shaping, in terms of reference and that kind of thing, but when we sit down at the NIFB meetings I have not worked over the drafts -- we work, we go together on that. That's just an example of the kinds of things that we do. It also seems to me that it is important in the National Security Council meetings which I attend, or in meetings with the President and his advisers, where these issues are discussed, that we put the intelligence as we understand it on the table so that we are working from a common base of information and that the President has an awareness of what the Community believes the intelligence indicates. When we shift to policy, the discussion of what to do about it, it seems to me there that my role, as DCI, is simply to be sure that the arguments that are being made, for or against a particular project, take into account the intelligence as we've given it to them. We've also taken the view in the past that when we send these estimates over -- sometimes there are internal pressures because the estimates create political issues, domestic political issues -- we've taken the position, and the President has never indicated anything to the contrary, nor has General Scowcroft, here it is, you can use it, you can apply it, you can file it, you can throw it away. But you can't

change it -- we will not change it to accommodate a political problem. And I think that also helps to increase the objectivity of our reporting.

We are talking about a range of problems, some in which we are trying to estimate where we're going in the future. Increasingly, probably because of regional disputes, Third World problems and so on, we get episodic situations where something flares up and we try to provide current intelligence on those issues. When that is happening, there is more likely to be a huddling of officials to deal with a problem as best we can. Other longer-range programs, like what's going to be our role in Eastern Europe, you're looking out in front but you'll also have to deal with an increasing rate of change -- the pace of change in some parts of the world is incredibly swift these days. And then you will have incidents. You will have terrorist incidents and you'll have a coup, and so on. We deal with those with the best kind of intelligence we have. But it is not our role to shape the policy. Let me take that just a point further if I could. The national security review process was put in place to provide an orderly way for intelligence to reach policy. It starts with the working groups, in which we participate, it moves on to the Deputies' Committee, in which we participate -- my deputy, Dick Kerr, is involved with that -- at each stage of that I'm informed, I have my chance to express -- they go knowing what my views are about the intelligence aspect, particularly if we're asked to do something, as distinguished from simply asked to assess the intelligence. Then it comes to the National Security Council, and it proceeds the way I've just described to you. Now that's a process; it's not a question like picking up the phone and saying "Mr. President, I've got a hot item for you." That occasionally happens, but rarely, and the President wants the information to be integrated with policy. But he does not want his DCI advancing foreign policy. I've tried to adhere to that. And I think I have.

OTTAWAY How much do you actually see of the President?

JUDGE Well, I have very comfortable access to him. I can see him every morning that I am available to see him, at the morning briefing.

OTTAWAY You usually do the morning briefing?

JUDGE No, we have a briefer who briefs -- we keep a -- continuity but I sit in and it gives me an opportunity to do a number of things. It gives me an opportunity to give the President additional information that I have and that may not be in the briefing; it gives me an opportunity to assess the value of our briefing -- in other words, to keep sharpening the quality of our morning briefing. This President is interested, and he has had experience with intelligence, he knows how to use it, he knows its limits, which is important. A lot of people down there do not know the limits of intelligence. But he asks questions that we can follow up on. And I have watched to be sure that those responses are taken care of. We are also providing similar information each day to Jim Baker,

Dick Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, and Bob Gates, and I follow through on their interest to be sure that they are covered. And, sometimes we provide additional information to them that we don't want to bother the President with details and things. So, I generally, I have an open invitation and I avail myself of it about half the time.

OTTAWAY The morning briefings?

JUDGE The morning briefings. I can go a little early or I can encroach on the next -- the next segment of time is policy. There again, you see a clear line, we go from intelligence to policy. We leave during those policy discussions. But I can encroach on their time if I have additional matters to discuss beyond what is in the printed material.

OTTAWAY You actually physically leave when they get around to discussing policy?

JUDGE Well, those are appointments, yeah, the policy. They have agenda items to discuss, I don't know what they....

OTTAWAY I guess the case in point centers on those two, Monday and Tuesday, regarding Panama. There does not seem to have been anyone from the Agency, I know you were abroad...

JUDGE I was abroad, and normally I am the only one who goes, aside from the briefer. But, uh, I've got about five thoughts hitting me at the same time. May I just finish the normal routine and we can come back to Panama, if you would like.

OTTAWAY Sure.

JUDGE I have my own staff meetings here on Tuesdays. I have two meetings, early morning meetings. And I go with my immediate senior staff and then I go into conference with others. So, it depends on whether I will go on Tuesday or not. But, often, more recently, in the last few months I have been finding I can get back here in time for both. I have a breakfast with Dick Cheney on Friday morning at which time we go over our items. So, I don't go to the briefing with the President because our briefing is set for 7:30, so I don't get to go. I have an early afternoon meeting with Jim Baker on Thursdays, and then I usually have a Community staff meeting downtown on Thursday afternoon. Sometimes the Intelligence Community meeting, which is not what you are talking about, then the NFIB meetings and then the staff meeting. Then I have a 5 o'clock meeting with Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gates every Thursday. That is where I can be sure that some of the management issues, some of our internal policy issues -- funding, other kinds of concerns, and particular issues that ought to be screened through the national security adviser before going to the President -- I use him as my means of communicating to the President things that Scowcroft thinks fit into the policy, beyond what I take to the President directly. I can call the President on the phone -- I prefer not to do that -- he has called me from time to time -- I prefer not to do that

because there is more of a risk in the sort of huddling approach that intelligence will not get through the places; that if we start at the top, it will not have been assessed in policy terms the way the President has set out to do it -- the three stages of evolution of policy. But I know that I can -- that he's there. And the other thing that I do if I want him to know something or have a thought on something, I stick it in the...I send it to be delivered with the President's Daily Brief in the morning. And the briefer hands it to him, from me. But I generally will make that information available to Scowcroft and others, but I want to be sure that he gets it and gets it from me rather than working itself through. I have that access and I use it. I get the Brief, the proposed brief, the galley proofs, between 9:30 and 10 o'clock at night at home. And I go over those. If I have any questions, and I deal with our Ops Center on those, and that gives me also a better chance when going down to the White House to have read the additional cables that have come through in the morning. In other words, you're in a crunch in trying to get that material digested before going to the President.

OTTAWAY That's eight o'clock in the morning?

JUDGE Yeah. I usually get there about a quarter of eight and meet with my own briefer to make sure we've got our stuff in shape. If I don't go to the PDB, I take my first briefing here at 7:45 with the Directorate of Operations and so they tell me what's going on. Do you want to go back to Panama?

OTTAWAY Well, I'm just wondering about the fact that there was no representative of the CIA...

JUDGE Well, the nine o'clock meeting....I wasn't here. You've really asked the wrong person. The nine o'clock meeting occurred while other principals were down there for other reasons, chiefs of state coming through, Yazov, and so on. I understand that Yazov was in the (words indistinct). My deputy was in direct touch with Scowcroft, he was talking to other principals as that thing proceeded. You're talking about a four-hour event. We supplied the intelligence the day before; it isn't often that you're able to say a coup started at X o'clock in the morning. But he was in communication, I was in Europe, receiving very good communication. I was receiving the reports as they came in and was following up on them. He was the Acting Director. I don't believe in trying to run a problem from some other part of the world. But I was getting the information, and then as the post-mortem business started I was in touch with him by phone and by cable, and that's instant cable for us. I asked for, and when I got back late Saturday night, I had a chronology of all the things that had taken place. I reviewed that chronology Saturday night and Sunday, I talked to Cheney and to Kerr, and we met on Monday morning in Scowcroft's office, when all of us had had our review of what had happened.

OTTAWAY The next Monday, right?

JUDGE Saturday, Sunday, Monday. I got back Saturday night.

OTTAWAY Before? The Saturday night before?

JUDGE No.

OTTAWAY After?

JUDGE Yeah. Here's my travel. I left on Saturday. The coup was on Tuesday, I was back Saturday night, and I had my chronology prepared, reviewed. I did it on Sunday, talked to Cheney, talked to Kerr, we had a meeting on Monday morning which was a holiday, Columbus Day, and we all met in Scowcroft's office and got squared away. And that's the way I -- that was my reentry process.

OTTAWAY You're saying that it's not necessary for a person from the CIA to necessarily be at the White House during those critical hours?

JUDGE Well, you're saying during those critical hours. You're talking about a kind of event; they looked at the process and I think you're going to be hearing about ways in which information got there. We have other capabilities in terms of television, conferencing, and so on that could easily be set up in the future. The President felt he had all the information. It was being disseminated very rapidly. Information coming out of -- I think this is some of the criticism I'm hearing from people who do not understand how intelligence works. The information we were sending out of Panama was coming through on a special line that goes through NSA and is immediately disseminated to the people who need to know it. The President had all that information.

OTTAWAY My function, had I been there, and I would have been welcome there if I had been there, my function would have been simply to be sure that the discussants had the intelligence, but they did have it. Do you get any feeling, I mean the reaction from the article, has the President indicated to you one way or the other how he feels about...defending the actions of the White House on that story?

JUDGE Well, I had a very thoughtful telephone call from the President this morning, and I don't talk about it because it's (word indistinct), but I had a very thoughtful telephone call. They've already released some responses to the article.

OTTAWAY On the issue of whether you've gone overboard, at least some people feel, in helping or trying to create better relations with Congress. What is your feeling about it?

JUDGE There really has been no increase in activity in terms of my changing any policies here on briefing Congress. I've worked to create a better relationship of trust by modifying, by changing the guidelines on how people testify....by trying to make sure that our people get it right the first time. And that if there are things

they shouldn't be talking about, that they decline to talk about them as not having the authority to do so, and then come back here and work it up the line that way. There have been times when I have had to take considerable heat because I declined to make some types of information available. I have a statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods. On the other hand, congressional oversight committees have statutory responsibilities of their own. We have to accommodate their....we are required by law to keep them advised of significant intelligence activities. They will frequently ask for information. We try to provide it if it is appropriate. The number of briefings that have been requested, demanded, have gone up to over 1000 last year.

OTTAWAY Compared to what before?

JUDGE Well, 15 years ago, 75. Now I'm not -- what I'm saying is that the Agency has to be responsive. The Congress, after all, holds the purse strings, can control our activities -- we've had experiences where when they didn't think we were being responsive they'd shut the programs down. So we have to strike a balance and that's the important thing -- an appropriate balance in which the people for whom I work, I work for the President, my responsibility is to the President. But in order to achieve a relationship in which the President's program receives support in the Congress, we have to convince the Congress -- the appropriate oversight committees -- that we know what we are doing and that what we're doing makes sense. In the last year or two, it has seemed to me that in the course of briefing, it has not been the sufficiency of intelligence but the clarity or wisdom of the policy that congressmen want to know about or question. And that often is not our bag. We defend the policy, but we don't make the policy.

OTTAWAY Well, I mean, so you've been trying to strike this balance between working for the President and keeping Congress on board. Yet wasn't one of your main purposes when President Reagan appointed you was to try to repair the damage done after Iran-Contra...?

JUDGE Well, you can't rebuild trust....trust starts with truth. When people think you're not telling them the correct story or you're giving disingenuous answers, then the trust factor is not there and the support that you need doesn't come. I can't think of any major challenge to our credibility in the last two years. And that's something I think we've worked hard to achieve. But we still -- my responsibility is to the President. It's his policy, and sometimes I think -- we do not intend ever to try to run to the Congress rather than discuss our problems with the White House. We have our avenues for doing that. We discuss unusual requests for testimony with the national security adviser, which leads me to think that that type of criticism comes from people who do not understand that we have talked to the White House about briefings. Sometimes our people get boxed up there -- you know, when suddenly something is asked of them that they haven't been prepared to do. But there the practice has been to immediately notify the department or the State

Department, of what has happened. Our testimony is often representative of the whole Community (words indistinct). But I think that the leadership in both intelligence committees have worked very constructively with us -- they don't always agree with us, and we don't always agree with them. Obviously, I'm not making very many points on the issue of the Inspector General. But I think it's important that they know my best judgment on it, and that I keep an option for the President open -- if he doesn't want to give that away.

OTTAWAY Judge, when you came in, did you have a vision of what you were trying to do in taking over the Agency?

JUDGE Well, you recall the circumstances under which I came. My first assignment was to deal with the Iran-Contra fallout, and I think that is done. My next responsibility as DCI is to do what I've been talking about, to provide useful, timely, and objective intelligence and to build our capabilities within the resources that are given to us.

OTTAWAY Does this mean de-politicization of information?

JUDGE That's part of it, yeah. Objective (words indistinct). Sometimes, as you know in Washington, it's not the fact, but the appearance of the fact that makes people support or not support a program. So we not only have to be objective; we have to be seen to be objective. But I also -- you know once you're here and you begin to wrap your arms around all the resources that are here and the talent, and try to marshal it, you begin to look at how you can be more effective. And that is by making sure that the Agency is relevant to a changing world. Ninety-five percent of our work used to be directed at the Soviet target. Now we have important changes in the world, Third World especially. We also see some shifting in our resources. As arms control comes to the front burner, our ability to verify and to monitor those agreements and to give meaningful advice to the policymakers who are striking those deals as to our ability to monitor, to look for new ways to be more effective, and from that standpoint, you've covered some of the issues I've expressed a public concern about, not to shape a policy, but to create an awareness in the chemical and the biological and missile proliferation that we are confronting, and that is going to go on. And I think in terms of relevance where we're going to have to put more emphasis -- and have been putting more emphasis -- into economic intelligence. Because world economics is driving a lot of the things -- Soviet foreign policy, Soviet arms policy, you track them back and economics is the base. What's happening in the Pacific Rim will affect us significantly. And I spoke about that to the World Affairs Council out in Los Angeles. I'm surprised at how many people had read it in Europe when I passed through there. Those are the things that I think we'll be paying attention to. Now, we put about three percent of our effort in covert action, of our resources, but that's a big part of what you write about, and what people criticize us about, or support us for doing if they

think we know what we are doing. And so I personally have to spend a lot of time, and do spend a lot of time, in that effort, and it's often things that are not seen.

If I could have a second off-the-record, again, that's all right, I don't mind, as long as it is understood that it's off-the-record. We have had problems with, and you wrote criticism about our Afghan program. Incidentally, that part of putting an analyst in charge of the Afghan program, you know, Len knows that's not the case. We talked about that. The fellow who was in charge of that was a very experienced operations officer who was undercover so I can't publicly say that.

OTTAWAY He is not a logistician, whatever you call that. He's not a, uh, how to get arms from A to Z, or A to B.

JUDGE No.

OTTAWAY He's not a mover of equipment, from A to B?

JUDGE No, but he was first, an operations officer. And, you put your managers, the one that is in there now is a former Chief of Station. And, we, he has logisticians in there working for him, darn good ones. They are very experienced and very effective. And, if you read the article that appeared in Sunday's paper by Chairman Beilenson and Charlie Wilson, who are, in fact, two people, who are, one of whom was not all that sure we ought to stay in Afghanistan, the other one who was hell for leather. They wrote that article, and it is accurate and factual, but we can't tell it. I have made, this is again off-the-record, I have made four trips over there, specific missions, two to Pakistan and two to Saudi Arabia. I have had to raise the money for it. I have been very much involved. I have had about five meetings with Mrs. Bhutto and the Yaqub Khan, and the other people, but that doesn't get over where I think some of that criticism is coming from. We have had two breakfasts down here, with the Afghan Club, who really spill a lot of misinformation. Some are very decent and want to help, and are supportive. Others have just run off with things that they should not be talking about in public.

OTTAWAY Your point is that you are involved in the details of the operation, which is one of the criticisms.

JUDGE Well, I think you ought to, you can talk to Dick Stolz or any of the others around here, if you haven't. But, the same thing is true on the Far East. I have run special missions out there. I am involved with the, the Panama thing is a two-year thing. We have been working that problem for a long time. The Contra thing has presented enormous numbers of personal issues; I have had to be involved in over time on that. But, policy determinations, Senate funding, and other things enter into the (passage indistinct) Start our briefing here with operations. So, I think that that is said more out of ignorance than anything.

OTTAWAY Well, Mrs. Bhutto, the Prime Minister, also said that there had been a cutback in supplies, it's not just Congressmen.

JUDGE That's not true. There is the chairman of the intelligence committee who reads our reports and answering that is not true. What we did, as we went in, our estimates on timing were not accurate in the sense that we did not anticipate that you were going to have over 3800 resupply missions by the Soviets, a thousand scuds fired over there. But, we surged going in and we surged in the last year, we spent about half a year's effort, got ordnance in there in the last quarter of the fiscal year, and we have spent the same amount this year as we spent last year. We had to go find it, but we spent it.